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Abstract—A self-organization of efficient and robust networks
is important for a future design of communication or trans-
portation systems, however both characteristics are incompatible
in many real networks. Recently, it has been found that the
robustness of onion-like structure with positive degree-degree
correlations is optimal against intentional attacks. We show that,
by biologically inspired copying, an onion-like network emerges
in the incremental growth with functions of proxy access and rein-
forced connectivity on a space. The proposed network consists of
the backbone of tree-like structure by copyings and the periphery
by adding shortcut links between low degree nodes to enhance
the connectivity. It has the fine properties of the statistically self-
averaging unlike the conventional duplication-divergence model,
exponential-like degree distribution without overloaded hubs,
strong robustness against both malicious attacks and random
failures, and the efficiency with short paths counted by the
number of hops as mediators and by the Euclidean distances.
The adaptivity to heal over and to recover the performance of
networking is also discussed for a change of environment in such
disasters or battlefields on a geographical map. These properties
will be useful for a resilient and scalable infrastructure of network
systems even in emergent situations or poor environments.
I. INTRODUCTION
Self-organizations with some outstanding properties of no
central control, emerging structures, resulting complexity, and
high scalability [1] appear in natural, social, and technological
systems. To make a structure autonomously, movements or
interactions of objects (materials or information) are necessary,
therefore naturally induce their flows and form a network as the
base. There are several fundamental mechanisms: preferential
attachment [2], copying [6], [7], survival [9], [10], subdivision
(fragmentation) [13], [14], [15], [16], or aggregation [17], for
generating networks in the interdisciplinary research fields
of physics, biology, sociology, and computer science. They
are summarized in Table I. However, even the state-of-the-art
science and technology is still far from fully understanding of
the potential for applying to a design of efficient and robust
networks, while our daily life strongly depends on network
infrastructures in energy supply, communication, transporta-
tion, economic, ecological, and biological (nervous or genetic)
systems.
As one of the most elucidated evidences, it has been
found [18], [19], [20], [21] that many real networks in social,
biological, and information systems have a scale-free (SF)
structure whose degree distribution follows a power-law; e.g.
the networks of coauthors, movie actors, protein interactions,
food webs, Internet, and WWW are included in this class
[22]. The SF network consists of many low degree nodes
and a few very large degree nodes. The key mechanism for
network generation is the preferential attachment [2] called
as rich-get-richer rule. In other words, people (= nodes)
tend to do economic trade with richer persons (= linking to
large degree nodes) to get more money in selfishness. The
SF networks have the efficient small-world (SW) property
[23] that the path length between any two nodes is short
even for a large network size, however they have an ex-
treme vulnerability against intentional attacks [24]. Thus, the
efficiency and the robustness are incompatible in many real
networks. In addition, the percolation analysis in statistical
physics has recently found [25], [26], [27] that the vulnerability
increases in interdependent networks: realistic modern systems
consisting of mutually related vulnerable networks in power-
grid, communication, transportation, economic-trading, and so
on. Disasters or terrorism are no longer unusual, moreover the
threat to induce a malfunction becomes more serious. Because
the above current networks are extremely vulnerable in the
interdependency, nevertheless to maintain the connectivity is
the most fundamental function as network.
Such a fat-tail distribution as power-law is also emerged
mathematically by other quite random and unselfish mecha-
nisms, e.g, multiplicative process: a quantity Xt at time t is
given by the product Xt =
(
Πt−1s=1rs
)
X0 [28], in which a
temporal accumulation of random growth rate 0 < rs < 1
contributes to make the inequality even for the uniform ran-
domness at each time step. Because the distribution follows
a log-normal from the central limit theory for logXt =∑
s log rs + logX0. Similar distributions have been obtained
in a simple model of random copying among individuals
in the evolution for studying cultural change [3], [4], [5].
The distributions consist of many uncommon variants and a
very few common variants, where cultural variants means first
names, journal citations, decorative motifs on archaeological
pottery, and patent citations in U.S. Thus, random copying may
induce a key mechanism to self-organize a complex structure
depending on a probabilistic selection history, however it is
not a network model. On the other hand, the biologically
inspired duplication process has been so far considered to be
fundamental in a model of protein-protein interaction networks
[6], [7]. It suggests that complex network structures can be
generated by a simple random process.
In this paper, we consider a self-organized design of
efficient and robust networks by biologically inspired copy-
ing. In particular, we focus on the robust network structure
Model Mechanism Reference
network preferential [2]
attachment
cultural change, copying or [3], [4], [5]
network duplication [6], [7]
trail, survival [8]
network [9], [10]
cracking, fragmentation or [11], [12]
network subdivision [13], [14], [15], [16]
cluster of mass, aggregation [12]
network [17]
TABLE I. TYPICAL SELF-ORGANIZATION MECHANISMS.
with positive degree-degree correlations [29], [30], [31] and
an incrementally growing mechanism. The self-propagation
in maintaining the robust structure is particularly important
for the scalability of network system without degrading the
performance.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Sec. II,
we briefly review related network models to ours. In Sec. III,
we propose a basic model for understanding the fundamental
mechanism of network self-organization from a viewpoint in
complex network science [18], [19], [20], [21] which aims
to elucidate the universal properties and the generation rule
of networks. We show the important properties of our model
for the robustness of connectivity and the emergent functions.
In Sec. IV, we consider an incrementally growing mechanism,
and investigate the strong robustness and the efficiency for path
lengths. We emphasis that the performance of our proposed
networks for both the robustness and the efficiency does not
degrade rather rises through the growth. In Sec. V, we discuss
the possibilities and the issues for applications especially
in communication or transportation systems. The adaptivity
for changing environment in disasters or battlefields is also
discussed. In Sec. VI, we summarize there results.
II. RELATED WORKS IN COMPLEX NETWORK SCIENCE
It is a reasonable assumption that a biological network
grows according to a simple mechanism based on random
copying which differs from the preferential attachment [2]
by selecting large degree nodes in selfishness. Thus, in the
duplication-divergence (D-D) model [6], [7], a new node is
added at each time step, and duplicately creates links to con-
nected neighbor nodes of a randomly chosen node. Some links
in the duplication are deleted with a probability δ. Without
using degrees for the selection of linked nodes, a distribution
of power-law with exponential cutoff emerges in the D-D
model. However, there is a serious problem that the models
by pure duplication without deletion of δ = 0 and by D-D
with weak deletion of small δ < 1/2 have a singular property
called as non-self-averaging [7], [32]; In the pure duplication
[32], bipartite graphs Kj,N−j in any combinations of positive
integers j and N − j are generated with equiprobability, the
degrees of j and N − j distribute uniformly. The statistical
quantities such as the degree distribution and the total number
j(N−j) of links in a sample of the networks have no meaning
to characterize the topological structure, since the range
between the minimum N − 1 at j = 1 and the maximum
(N/2)2 at j = N/2 diverges for a large size N . In addition,
the attack vulnerability remains in the D-D model because of
the SF-like network.
On the other hand, the optimal structure against the
targeted attacks to hub nodes has been shown numerically
[29], [30] and analytically [31] in a SF network. It is referred
to onion-like structure (see Fig. 1) from the character of
connectivity with positive degree-degree correlations, which
correspond to a natural tendency of homophily: nodes are more
likely connect to other nodes that are similar to them. Under
a given degree distribution, an onion-like network with the
nearly optimal robustness can be generated by rewirings to
enhance the degree-degree correlations [33]. Thus, the onion-
like structure is applicable to a network with any degree
distribution. For example, after the rewirings, the attack vul-
nerability is decreased for a power-law degree distribution
in a SF network generated by the preferential attachment or
other methods. However, the entire rewiring process discards
already existing links, it is not effective utilization when a
network is growing in a realistic situation. Moreover, in spite
of the improvement of robustness, the positive degree-degree
correlations in a SF network tend to induce longer path lengths
[34], which are undesirable for the efficient communication or
transportation. We should not persist SF networks, and study
other candidates for future design of networks, especially in
considering self-organization mechanisms.
Fig. 1. Illustration of onion-like network structure, in which nodes with a
same degree are set on each concentric circle denoted by a dashed line. The
solid line denotes a link between two nodes. The size of node is proportional
to its degree.
III. BASIC PROPERTIES
In this section, we consider a self-organization of onion-
like network, and show the tolerant and topological prop-
erties of robustness, degree distribution, and degree-degree
correlation. To study the connectivity in a network structure
independently of applications is important for clarifying the
basic property.
A. Network model
We propose a modification of the D-D model [6], [7],
[32] without mutation. Mutations by connecting randomly
chosen two nodes are unnecessary for generating an onion-
like network. The basic processes of network construction by
using only local information are as follows (see Fig. 2).
Step 0: Set an initial configuration (e.g. connected two
nodes).
Step 1: At each time step t = 1, 2, . . ., a new node is
added. The new node i connects to a randomly
chosen node and to the neighbor nodes j with a
probability (1− δ)× p [33],
p =
1
1 + a | ki − kj |
, (1)
where δ is a rate of link deletion, a ≥ 0 is a
parameter, and ki and kj denote the degrees of
nodes i and j.
Step 2: The above processes are repeated up to a given
size N in prohibiting self-loops at a node and
duplicate connections between two node.
In Step 1, ki is temporary set as (1 − δ)× the degree of
the chosen node, since the degree of new node is unknown in
advance because of the stochastic process. When degrees ki
and kj are close, the two nodes i and j are connected with high
probability. The case of a = 0 without the correlation effect
corresponds to the conventional D-D model except the mutual
link between new node and chosen node. We set a = 0.3.
Figure 3 shows that our proposed networks satisfy a good
property of the self-averaging unlike the conventional D-D
model: the statistical deviation χ def=
√
〈M2〉 − 〈M〉2/〈M〉
for the total number M of links converges to zero for a large
size N . Here, 〈 〉 denotes the statistical mean (expectation).
We remark a reason of the self-averaging by that a sequence of
complete graphs is generated in our case of pure duplication
of δ = 0 instead of bipartite graphs in the conventional D-D
model [32]. Therefore, with a small change from the conven-
tional D-D model by adding the mutual links, the tendency of
dense connections (whose extreme case is a complete graph)
induces a core of connected high degree nodes. In addition,
since there is an effect of preferential attachment to the random
neighbors [35], [36], large degree nodes i and j tend to be
connected together when the chosen node has a large degree.
The positive degree-degree correlations is suitable to improve
the robustness, especially for the malicious attacks [29], [30].
However, such correlations between low degree nodes are
weak in the tree-like structure as shown in the top of Fig. 4.
Since a low degree node dangles from a higher degree node,
the dangling part is easy to be disconnected by node removals.
We remark that the majority is low degree nodes. Thus, we
consider the addition of shortcut links [23] in Step 3.
Step 3 : After Step 2, some shortcut links between ran-
domly chosen nodes i and j are added with the
probability of Eq.(1). The number of shortcut
links are given by pscM , where psc is an adding
rate of shortcut and M is the total number of links
in the original tree-like network generated for the
size N .
The bottom of Fig. 4 shows an onion-like structure by adding
shortcut links after Step 2. In the next subsection, as a basic
property, we will separately discuss the effects of copyings
and adding shortcuts on the robustness in order to make them
clearly.
We emphasize the two important functions. First, a new
node act as a local proxy of the chosen node and becomes
divergence
(deletion)
randomly
chosen
existing nodes
in the network
duplication: a new node links to the connected
neighbors of a randomly chosen node
+ mutual link
new
Fig. 2. Basic process in constructing a network.
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Fig. 3. Self-averaging with a convergence over 100 realizations. The red,
green, blue, magenta, and cyan lines correspond to the cases of δ = 0.1, 0.3,
0.5, 0.7 and 0.9, respectively.
another access point for the neighbor nodes in an analogy
of distributed computer communication systems. Second, the
complementary added shortcuts improve the robustness. It
has already been shown that adding some shortcut links be-
tween uniform randomly chosen nodes improves the robustness
in the theory for the small-world model [37] and also in the
numerical simulations for many networks [10], [15], [16], [38].
The robustness is further improved due to the positive degree-
degree correlations in the onion-like network as shown later,
however the case of δ = 0 as the uniform random selections
does not give the nearly optimal robustness.
In addition, the proposed network has an efficiency without
maintaining huge connections. Figure 5 shows that the degree
distributions are approximated by exponential distributions.
Therefore, huge degree nodes do not appear in the network, it
is suitable for avoiding both the attack vulnerability [24] and
the concentration of linking cost or traffic load [39]. Note that
the proposed network does not belong to a SF network, since
the degree distribution is not a power-law but an exponential.
B. Measures of robustness and degree-degree correlations
We consider the malicious attacks, in which nodes are
removed in decreasing order of the current degrees through
Fig. 4. Visualization examples for N = 100. (Top) a tree-like network by
copyings for δ = 0.5. (Bottom) the extended onion-like network by adding
shortcut links. The sizes of nodes are proportional to their degrees.
the recalculations [40]. This type of attacks is a more serious
problem setting from an assumption of circumspect terrorism
than the attacks without recalculations. Attackers tend to aim at
large degree nodes, since the removals give considerable dam-
age to maintaining paths by many disconnections emanated
from the removed nodes. We compare the robustness of the
proposed network with the nearly optimal case under the same
degree distribution. The nearly optimal case is given by the
rewired version defined as follows. According to the stub-
connection process until all the stubs have been used up [33],
with a probability
1
1 + a | si − sj |
,
the connections of randomly selected nodes i and j are re-
peated. Here, si and sj denote the rank for the degrees of nodes
i and j. A remaining small part of unpaired stubs is remedied
by the reshuffle procedure. In the stub-connection process, the
initial configuration consists of all unpaired stubs: any node
i has ki free links (whose linked nodes are undetermined)
assigned from a given degree distribution P (k).
We have two measures for investigating the robustness and
the degree-degree correlations. The robustness is measured by
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Fig. 5. Degree distributions over 100 realizations of our proposed network
for N = 5000. The dotted magenta and chain cyan straight lines are
the approximations by exponential distributions: 0.289 exp(−0.209k) and
0.446 exp(−0.309k), respectively. By adding shortcut links, the fraction of
small degree nodes is slightly increased from the dotted blue line to the dashed
green line.
the following index [29], [30], [33]
R =
1
N
1∑
q=1/N
S(q), (2)
where S(q) denotes the number of nodes in the giant compo-
nent (GC: largest connected cluster) after removing qN nodes
by the malicious attacks. S(q) is monotonically decreased
for increasing q from an initial configuration of S(0) = N .
The range of R is [0, 0.5], where R = 0 corresponds to a
completely disconnected network consisting of isolated nodes,
and R = 0.5 corresponds to the most robust network.
The degree-degree correlation is measured by the assorta-
tivity [20]
r =
S1Se − S
2
2
S1S3 − S22
, (3)
where S1 =
∑
i ki, S2 =
∑
i k
2
i S3 =
∑
i k
3
i , Se =∑
ij Aijkikj , Aij denotes the i-j element of the adjacency
matrix. The right-hand side of Eq. (3) is a suitable scheme for
the numerical calculation of r than the original definition [41].
The range of r is [−1, 1] as the Pearson correlation coefficient
of the degree. Nodes with similar degrees tend to be connected
as r > 0 is larger, while nodes with different degrees tend to
be connected as r < 0 is smaller (but |r| is larger).
Figure 6 shows a scatter plot of robustness index R versus
assortativity r. The open marks correspond to the proposed
networks, and the filled marks correspond to the rewired
versions at the optimal [33]. We set δ = 0.5 for the added
versions with shortcut links for rates psc = 0.2 and 0.5.
The values of R become larger as δ is smaller in the tree-
like networks with more links (denoted by open triangles and
diamond marks). While the robustness is improved by adding
shortcut links (denoted by open square and circle marks) in
comparison with these corresponding results in the similar
connection density level of the average degree 〈k〉:
δ = 0.5, psc = 0.5 ↔ δ = 0.3: 〈k〉 ≈ 6.3
δ = 0.5, psc = 0.2 ↔ δ = 0.4: 〈k〉 ≈ 5.2
δ = 0.5: 〈k〉 ≈ 4.3
and saturated around the nearly optimal for the rewired ver-
sions (denoted by filled marks). The dashed arrows show the
improvement for the robustness, and the almost flat ones mean
that the proposed networks with shortcuts have the nearly
optimal robustness. Here, from ovals to dashed ovals, the
decrease of r is not strange for the rewired version to be
onion-like structure with higher robustness. Because it has
been pointed out that onion structure and assortativity are
distinct property [29]: Not all assortative networks have onion
structure but all onion networks are assortative [33].
Fig. 6. Scatter plot of robustness index R vs assortativity r in sampling the
networks for N = 5000.
IV. GROWING SELF-ORGANIZATION
We further consider an incrementally growing onion-like
networks by simultaneous processes of copyings and adding
shortcuts. Because the tree-like network leaves its robustness
weak in the growth except at the final stage by adding many
shortcut links. Thus, we modify the shortcut process as follows
in Step 2. Instead, Step 3 is omitted.
Step 2’: In Step 2, at every interval IT , shortcut links
are added between randomly chosen nodes i and
j according to the probability of Eq.(1). This
process is repeated up to pscM(t) links. Here,
M(t) denotes the total number of links in the
network at that time t = IT, 2IT, 3IT, . . ..
In this section, we numerically show the strong robustness
against both attacks and failures and the efficiency for path
lengths in the incrementally growing onion-like networks. Not
only the emergent structure in distributed manner but also the
scalability without performance degradation are important for
δ psc r R by attacks R by failures
0.4 0.003 0.412 0.246 0.427
0.5 0.006 0.347 0.267 0.439
0.6 0.010 0.277 0.283 0.447
0.9 0.018 0.192 0.281 0.448
0.3 - 0.442 0.127 0.356
TABLE II. COMPARISON OF ASSORTATIVITY r AND ROBUSTNESS
INDEX R IN THE NETWORKS FOR N = 5000 WITH 〈k〉 ≈ 6.3.
the self-organization, and don’t appear in the rewiring model
[33].
A. Robustness in the incrementally growing networks
In order to be 〈k〉 ≈ 6.3 at N = 5000 with IT = 50,
we chose a combination of parameters: δ = 0.4 & psc =
0.003, δ = 0.5 & psc = 0.006, δ = 0.6 & psc = 0.010,
δ = 0.9 & psc = 0.018, and the corresponding δ = 0.3 in
the tree-like networks. Since the robustness of connectivity
depends on a degree distribution but increases as the average
degree 〈k〉 is larger with more links in general, a same level
of connection density must be set to compare the robustness
in several networks. Note that the size is N = t+N0 at time
t, where N0 denotes the initial size (N0 = 2 when the initial
configuration is a connected two nodes).
Figure 7(a) shows the relative size S(q)/N of nodes
belonging to the GC versus the fraction q of removed nodes
by the malicious attacks. From the tree-like (denoted by cyan
dashed line) to the onion-like (denoted by other lines) net-
works, the robustness is significantly improved, as δ is larger.
However the difference in δ = 0.4 ∼ 0.9 is small. For the
breaking of the GC, the critical fraction qc is 0.3 < qs < 0.4
for the onion-like networks but very small ≪ 0.1 for the tree-
like networks as shown in Fig. 7(b) and the inset. At the peak,
the GC breaks off and is divided into small clusters. Note
that the critical fraction qc is around 0.03 for the SF network
models [38] and the Internet data at the level of autonomous
system [24], [38], [42]. Figure 8(a) shows that the values
of S(q)/N is sustained without a considerable drop against
random node removals, except the case of δ = 0.3 (denoted
by cyan dashed line). Note that the virtual line of angle −45◦
is the most robust case of R = 0.5 in the complete graph with
the maximum 〈k〉 = N−1: wasteful links. The critical fraction
qc is about 0.8 for the onion-like networks but < 0.1 for the
tree-like networks as shown in Fig. 8(b). Remember that the
robustness index R defined in Eq.(2) indicates the area under
a line of S(q)/N . Thus, higher robustness (values of R) in the
growing onion-like networks is obtained than that in the tree-
like networks for δ = 0.3. Note that the value of R include
more information in order to compare the robustness, since
different values of R can exits even when some networks have
a same value of qc. The assortativity r and robustness index
R are summarized in Table II. As the deletion rate δ is larger,
r is smaller, while R is almost constant in both cases of the
attacks and the failures.
We also study a spatially growing method. We consider
the initial configuration of connected two nodes located at the
center with the link length 20 in a 160× 160 square. At each
time step in Step 1, from the center of a randomly chosen
node, a new node is set on the radius of random number
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Fig. 7. Attack tolerance. (a) Relative size S(q)/N against malicious attacks
for N = 5000. (b) The corresponding average size 〈s(q)〉 of isolated clusters
other than the GC. These results are averaged over 100 realizations × 10
attacks to absorb the effect of random selection for tie-breaking of same
degree.
between rmin and rmax with any direction as similar to the
basic idea of [43]. We set rmin = 15 and rmax = 20. As
shown in the top of Fig. 9, the growing networks spread out
diffusively on the space according to the time course. Figure
10 shows the relation of 〈k〉 and R through the growth. In
the incrementally growing onion-like networks for the values
of δ and psc, the marks of green plus, red cross, blue open
square, and magenta open circle on each line correspond to the
size N = 200, 400, 600, . . . , 5000 from left to right. Therefore,
both 〈k〉 and R increase with the time course. The robustness
is reinforced with increasing 〈k〉. In other words, the network
becomes more and more robust through the growth. However,
〈k〉 hardly vary and R slightly decreases in the tree-like
networks denoted by the marks of cyan triangle and black
filled circle. The directions of lines are from top to bottom
for N = 200, 400, 600, . . . , 5000 in the time course. The long
upper jump of a gray dashed line is due to become onion-
like networks finally at N = 5000 by adding many shortcut
links with the rate psc = 0.5 in Step 3. Through the growth,
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Fig. 8. Failure tolerance. (a) Relative size S(q)/N against random failures
for N = 5000. (b) The corresponding average size 〈s(q)〉 of isolated clusters
other than the GC. These results are averaged over 100 realizations.
the assortativity r is almost constant around 0.3 ∼ 0.4, except
it increases (from −0.1 to 0.2) in the case of δ = 0.9 &
psc = 0.018.
B. Efficiency for path lengths
The efficiency for communication or transportation is mea-
sured by the average path lengths on the shortest paths over
the network. The length is usually counted by the minimum
number of hops between two nodes. Because a path which
passes through as few mediator nodes as possible gives lower
cost (energy consumption) and more tolerant (safety or stable)
operation for time-delay or information loss. Short paths are
also related to reduce traffic load defined by the betweenness
centrality [44]: the frequency of passing through a node or a
link on the paths between all pairs of nodes. The frequency
can be weighted by an inhomogeneously distributed (commu-
nication or transportation) requests, e.g. proportional to the
products of populations around source and destination nodes
on a space [45], [46] in more realistic situation.
Figure 11 shows that the distributions of path lengths in
Fig. 9. Time evolution in the case of δ = 0.5, psc = 0.006, and IT = 50 for
N = 200, 400, and 800 from left to right. (Top) Spatially growing networks.
(Bottom) The corresponding onion-like topologies, in which the sizes of nodes
are proportional to their degrees in order to show the core of connected high
degree nodes and the periphery of connected low degree nodes.
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Fig. 10. Relation of the average degree 〈k〉 and the robustness index R in
the incrementally growing networks with IT = 50.
the networks at a same connection density level of 〈k〉 ≈ 6.3.
The widths are narrower around 5 hops in the growing onion-
like networks denoted by green dashed, red solid, blue dashed,
and magenta dotted lines for δ = 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, and 0.9 than
that in the tree-like networks denoted by cyan chain line for
δ = 0.3. The path lengths are short around 5 hops in average
and at most about 10 hops for N = 5000. Thus, the growing
onion-like networks are efficient with short paths.
In more detail for the emergence of SW property [23], it is
important whether the average path length follows O(logN)
for the size N under a constant connection density. Inset of Fig.
12 shows the SW property in the tree-like networks denoted
by cyan and orange chain lines for δ = 0.3 and 0.5. Moreover,
as shown in Fig. 12, the path lengths are very short around 5-
6 hops in the growing onion-like networks denoted by green
dashed, red solid, and blue dashed lines for δ = 0.4, 0.5,
and 0.6, except with slightly higher values of 〈Lij〉 (longer
path lengths) in N < 103 denoted by magenta dotted line
for δ = 0.9 than the case of tree-like networks denoted by
cyan and orange chain lines for δ = 0.3 and 0.5. We should
remark that the average degree 〈k〉 is not constant within a
connection density but increasing in the growing onion-like
networks. Moreover, 〈k〉 is smaller than that in the tree-like
networks for δ = 0.3 as shown in Fig. 10. Smaller 〈k〉 means
fewer total links, and the network construction is less expensive
in lower cost especially in an early stage of growth.
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Fig. 11. Distribution of path lengths in the networks for N = 5000 with
〈k〉 ≈ 6.3. The case for δ = 0.3 is tree-like networks, and the other cases
are onion-like networks.
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Fig. 12. Average path length 〈Lij〉 counted by the number of minimum
hops between two nodes over the network. The convex curves in the growing
onion-like networks for δ = 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, and 0.9 are caused by the increase
of 〈k〉 (see Fig 10). Inset show the SW property as a straight line in a semilog
graph; the average path length on the tree-like networks for δ = 0.3 or 0.5
follows O(logN) in three-digit number.
Another important measure is the path distance, which is
defined by the sum of Euclidean distances for the links on
the shortest path (counted by the minimum number of hops)
between two nodes. This measure is corresponding to the load
of physical movements for (communication or transportation)
flows on a space, instead of the load of routing process (for
switching the transfer direction) defined by the number of
mediator nodes on the path.
Figure 13 shows the distribution of path distances Dij , in
which the majorities are short around the size 160 of outer
square. The case of δ = 0.3 as the tree-like network denoted
by cyan chain line has longer distances than other cases, since
the distribution is shift to the right. We also confirm the SW
property of O(logN) for the path distance as shown in Fig.
14. The green dashed, red solid, and blue dotted lines for δ =
0.4, 0.5, and 0.6 in the onion-like networks are below the
cyan and orange chain lines for δ = 0.3 and 0.5 in the tree-
like networks, except the magenta dotted line for δ = 0.9.
Thus, the onion-like networks has shorter path distances than
the tree-like networks within a same connection density level,
although the advantage in the Euclidean distances is weak in
comparison with that in the number of hops (see Figs. 12 and
14). Note that we have similar results for the path length Lij
and distance Dij , when we chose the shortest distance path
instead of the above shortest path defined by the minimum
number of hops between two nodes. The difference of shortest
(Euclidean) distance path and shortest (minimum hops) path
is very small in these spatial networks, in other words, they
give similar efficiency for the routing paths in these measures.
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Fig. 13. Distribution of path distance in the networks for N = 5000 with
〈k〉 ≈ 6.3. The frequency is counted in the histogram of bin width one for
real values of Dij . The case for δ = 0.3 is tree-like networks, and the other
cases are onion-like networks.
V. DISCUSSIONS FOR APPLICATIONS
In this section, we will discuss the possibilities or issues
in our proposed networks for applications of communication
or transportation systems. There exist flows which represent
movements of one entity relative to another on a network.
Thus, we categorize the dynamics in networks into the follow-
ing types.
Type 1. Dynamics of network configuration itself
Type 2. Dynamics of information flows, rumor spreading,
opinion formation, synchronization, or logistics
on a network
Through this paper, we study the Type 1 of dynamics in
order to aim a fundamental mechanism for the self-organized
design of efficient and robust networks. Temporal and/or
fixed (corresponding to wireless and/or wired) connections
 80
 100
 120
 140
 160
 180
 200
102 103
<
D
ij>
N
δ=0.3
δ=0.5
δ=0.4, psc=0.003δ=0.5, psc=0.006δ=0.6, psc=0.010δ=0.9, psc=0.018
Fig. 14. Average path distance 〈Dij 〉 counted by the sum of Euclidean
distances on the paths with the minimum hops between two nodes over the
network. The slopes of green, red, and blue lines in the onion-like networks
are slightly gentle than ones of cyan and orange lines in the tree-like networks.
are possible depending on the time-scale for changing the
connection structure in a network. The quick change results
in ad hoc networks, while the slow change is treated as an
incremental modification of network. Both cases and the mixed
one are not excluded, however we have assumed that each
node or link is persisted once it is added unless removed by
failures or attacks to simplify the discussion in Sections II-
IV. The Type 2 of dynamics is significant for applications,
e.g. wireless, sensor, mobile communication systems or au-
tonomous transportation systems. In the Type 2 of dynamics,
operation protocols for birth and death of communication
or transportation request, routing, avoidance of congestion,
task allocation, queuing, awareness of location, monitoring of
system’s states or conditions, and so on [49], are necessary.
There are many methods for the efficient operations that are
independent (generally applicable) or dependent on a special
network structure. The detail discussions are strongly related
to device technologies, users, and situations of utilization, they
are beyond our current scope.
Even when we focus on the Type 1 of dynamics, there
are two kinds of interactions among individuals (nodes) and
with environment [1] for the operation and control in a
self-organized system. In particular, we consider changes of
environment and the adaptivity in a network. Here, adaptivity
is defined as the capability to work in different or changing
environment without intervention and configuration by an
administrator [1]. The levels of adaptation are distinguished
as shown in Table III.
At the Level 1, a compensatory growth for removed parts
by attacks or failures is related to an adaptivity with healing
function in the incrementally growing onion-like networks
because of the potential with strong robustness. The function
of proxy at a new node locally contributes to make different
access paths through the copying process as mentioned in
subsection II A. On the other hand, node mobility may
give rise to other problems of disconnections in a limited
Level 1: The simplest adaptivity is to cope with changes
such as failures and mobility.
Level 2: In order to react to changes and to optimize
the system performance, protocols should be
able to adapt their own parameters, e.g. timers
and cluster size.
Level 3: In case of dramatic changes, the complete change
of the employed algorithms can be necessary, e.g.
the exchange of a no longer converging clustering
algorithm.
TABLE III. THREE LEVEL OF ADAPTATION QUOTED FROM PP.57 IN
CHAPTER 5 OF REF.[1].
transmission range of wireless beam, handover for high-speed
environment, or loss of data and navigational routes. When a
communication network is often disconnected but resilient due
to node mobility, limited radio power, node or link failure, it is
known as a Delay/Disruption Tolerant Network (DTN) where
a mobile device or software agent temporary stores and carries
local information for forwarding messages until an end-to-end
route is re-established or re-generated. It is used in disasters,
battlefields, and vehicular communications. There are many
protocols in the concept of DTN routing [47], [48]. As a base
structure for DTN, it is obviously better to have many short
paths and to maintain tolerant path connectivity for temporal
changes of nodes or links. Our growing onion-like network
becomes one of the candidates of DTN.
At the Level 2, in our growing network, it will be useful
to regulate the parameters of δ, psc, and IT in order to
repair the damaged parts and to recover the performance
for communication or transportation according to a limited
resource and the state of network system monitored at a time.
The scheduling is a further issue, and it is also important
how to detect the damaged parts or malfunctions caused from
overload beyond a capacity in a realistic network. At the
Level 3, a change of the intrinsic mechanism for generating
a network is required. Since the required change depends on
the scale or the speed of damages or evolutions, we should
develop a proper measure to evaluate them in many complex
situations.
Apart from the basic property, only random failures and
malicious attacks by removing nodes in decreasing order of
their current degrees are insufficient to investigate the robust-
ness in a realistic network. Natural disasters such as earthquake
or flood and unremitting armed conflicts with aerial bombing
give rise to spatially spreading damages. They probably make
complex shapes of removed part in the network according
to a geographical map. Although we treat a simple spatially
growing method in Section IV, we need more consideration. In
addition, how to locate a node on a space should be discussed
more carefully e.g. for the geographical allocation of mobile
base stations for wireless communication in an emergent case
of disaster or poor infrastructural environment. In any cases,
incremental repair and reinforced construction will be powerful
approaches.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a self-organized design method for gen-
erating efficient and robust networks. It is based on biologically
inspired copyings and the complementary adding shortcut links
to enhance the robustness. In particular, tanking into account
positive degree-degree correlations, we have considered incre-
mentally growing onion-like networks, which emerges from
the backbone of tree-like structure generated by copyings and
the periphery of shortcut links between low degree nodes. The
obtained properties are fine as follows. We emphasize that
these properties are not trivially predicted from a combination
of copyings and adding shortcuts.
• non-singular self-averaging property unlike the con-
ventional D-D model [6], [7], [32]
→ to ensure statistically meaningful convergence for
a large size N in samples
• growing with the compensatory function of local
proxy as another access point
• exponential degree distribution without huge hubs
→ to avoid the concentration of linking cost and traffic
load at a few nodes [39]
• strong tolerance of connectivity against failures and
attacks equivalent to the nearly optimal in the rewired
version [33] under a same degree distribution
• efficiency with short path lengths and distances
(counted by the number of hops and the Euclidean
distances, respectively, on the shortest path) for com-
munication or transportation, in addition the path
length is superior to the O(logN) SW property [23]
in a sense
Moreover, we have discussed the possibilities and issues for
applications in wireless and/or wired communication or trans-
portation systems, and particularly mentioned the adaptivity
to heal over and to recover the performance of networking
for a change of environment in such disasters or battlefields
on a geographical map. In this paper, we have considered
a self-configuration of efficient and robust network in an
incremental and distributed manner. The proposed method
does not require the entirely rewiring processes on a network
[33]. Thus, the obtained results will be useful for temporal
evolution of a resilient network system. Other capabilities
and realistic strategies for self-diagnosis, self-protection, self-
healing, self-repair, and self-optimization [1] are further issues.
We will study effectively applicable methods to self-organize
networks which keep high robustness and efficient paths for
communication or transportation in both normal and emergent
situations.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This research is supported in part by a Grant-in-Aid for
Scientific Research in Japan, No. 25330100.
REFERENCES
[1] F. Dressler, Self-Organization in Sensor and Actor Networks, Joh Wiley
& Sons, 2007.
[2] A.-L. Babara´si, and R. Albert, “Emergence of scaling in random
networks,” Science, vol.286, pp.509-512, 1999.
[3] F.D. Neiman, “Stylistic variation in evolutionary perspective: Inferences
from decorative diversity and interassemblage distance in Illinois Wood-
land ceramic assemblages,” American Antiquity, vol60, no.1, pp.7-36,
1995.
[4] R.A. Bentley, and S.J. Shennan, “Cultural transmission and stochastic
network growth,” American Antiquity, vol.68, no.3, pp.459-485, 2003.
[5] R.A. Bentley, M.W. Hahn, and S.J. Shennan, “Random drift and culture
change,” Proceedings of the Royal Society B, vol.271, pp.1443-1450,
2004.
[6] R.V. Sole, R. Pastor-Satorras, E.R. Smith, and T.B. Kepler, “A model of
large-scale proteome evolution,” Advances in Complex Systems, vol.5,
pp.43-54, 2002.
[7] R. Pastor-Satorras, E.R. Smith, and R.V. Sole, “Evolving protein in-
teraction networks through gene duplication,” Journal of Theoretical
Biology, vol.222, pp.199-210, 2003.
[8] D. Helbing, J. Keltsch, and P. Molna´r, “Modeling the evolution of
human trail systems,” Nature, vol.388, pp.47-50, 1997.
[9] A. Tero, S. Takagi, T. Saigusa, K. Ito, D.P. Bebber, M.D. Fricker,
K. Yumiki, R. Kobayashi, and T. Nakagaki, “Rules for Biologically
Inspired Adaptive Network Design,” Science, vol.327, pp.439-442,
2010.
[10] Y. Hayashi, and Y. Megumo, “Self-organized network design by link
survivals and shortcuts,” Physica A, vol.391, pp.872-879, 2012.
[11] W. Nagel, J. Mecke, J. Ohser, and V. Weiss, “A tesssellation model for
crack patterns on surface,” Image Analysis & Stereology, vol.27, no.2,
pp.73-78, 2008.
[12] P.L. Krapivsky, S. Redner, and E. Ben-Naim, A Kinetic View of
Statistical Physics, Cambridge University Press, 2010.
[13] J.P.K. Doye, and C.P. Massen, “Self-similar disk packings as model
spatial scale-free networks,” Physical Review E, vol.71, pp.016128,
2005.
[14] T. Zhou, G. Yan, and B.-H. Wang, “Maximal planar networks with
large clustering coefficient and power-law degree distribution,” Physical
Review E vol.71, pp.046141, 2005.
[15] Y. Hayashi, “Necessary Backbone of Super-highways for Transport
on Geographical Complex Networks,” Advances in Complex Systems,
vol.12, no.1, pp.73-86, 2009.
[16] Y. Hayashi, Evolutionary Construction of Geographical Networks
with Nearly Optimal Robustness and Efficient Routing Proper-
ties, Physica A, vol.388, pp.991-998, 2009. Corrigendum (2011):
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378437112002592
[17] M.J. Alava, and S.N. Dorogovtsev, “Complex networks created by
aggregation,” Physical Review E, vol.71, pp.036107, 2005.
[18] S.N. Dorogovtsev, and J.F.F. Mendes, Evolution of Networks -From
Biological Nets to the Internet and WWW-, Oxford University Press,
2004.
[19] M.E.J Newman, A.-L. Baraba´si, and D.J. Watts, The Structure and
Dynamics of Networks, Princeton University Press, 2006.
[20] M.E.J Newman, Networks -An Introduction-, Oxford University Press,
2010.
[21] R. Choen, and S. Havlin, Complex Networks -Structure, Robustness
and Function-, Cambridge University Press, 2010.
[22] R. Albert, and A.-L. Baraba´si, “Statistical mechanism of complex
networks,” Reviews of Modern Physics, vol.74, no.1, pp.47-94, 2002.
[23] D.J. Watts, and S.H. Strogatz, “Collective dynamics of small-world
networks,” Nature, vol.393, pp.440-442, 1998.
[24] R. Albert, and A.-L. Baraba´si, Error and attack tolerance of complex
networks, Nature, vol.406, pp.378-382, 2000.
[25] S.V. Buldyrev, R. Parshani, G. Paul, H.E. Stanley, and S. Havlin,
“Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks,” Nature,
vol.464, 1025-1028, 2010.
[26] X. Huang, J. Gao, S.V. Buldyrev, S. Havlin, and H.E. Stanley, “Ro-
bustness of interdependent networks under targeted attacks,” Physical
Review E, vol.83, pp.065101(R), 2011.
[27] X. Huang, S. Shao, H. Wang, S.V. Buldyrev, H.E. Stanley, and
S. Havlin, “The robustness of interdependent clustered networks,”
Europhysics Letters, vol.101, no.1, pp.18002, 2012.
[28] M. Mitzenmacher, “A Brief History of Generative Models for Power
Law and Lognormal Distributions,” Internet Mathematics, vol.1, no.2,
pp.226-251, 2004.
[29] C.M. Schneider, A.A. Moreira, J.S. Andrade, Jr., S. Havlin, and
H.J. Herrmann, “Mitigation of malicious attacks on networks,” Proceed-
ings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol.810, no.10, pp.3838-3841,
2011.
[30] H.J. Herrmann, C.M. Schneider, A.A. Moreira, J.S. Andrade, Jr., and
S. Havlin, “Onion-like network topology enhances robustness against
malicious attacks,” Journal of Statistical Mechanics, pp.P01027, 2011.
[31] T. Tanizawa, S. Havlin, and H.E. Stanley, “Robustness of onionlike
correlated networks against targeted attacks,” Physical Review E, vol.85,
pp.046109, 2012.
[32] I. Ispolatov, P.L. Krapivsky, and A. Yuryev, “Duplication-divergence
model of protein interaction network,” Physical Review Letters, vol.71,
pp.061911, 2005.
[33] Z.-X. Wu, and P. Holme, “Onion structure and network robustness,”
Physical Review E, vol.84, pp.026116, 2011.
[34] T. Tanizawa, “Structural robustness and transport efficiency of complex
networks with degree correlation,” IEICE Trans. on Fundamentals,
Special Issue on Nonlinear Theory and Its Applications, vol.4, no.2,
pp.138-147, 2013.
[35] X.-H. Yang, S.-L. Lou, G. Chen, S.-Y. Chen, and W. Huang, “Scale-
free networks via attachment to random neighbors,” Physica A, vol.392,
pp.3531-3536, 2013.
[36] E.R. Colman, and G.J. Rodgers, “Complex scale-free networks with tun-
able power-law exponent and clustering,” Physica A, vol.392, pp.5501-
5510 (2013).
[37] M.E.J. Newman, C. Moore, and D.J. Watts, “Mean-Field Solution of
the Small-World Network Model,” Physical Review Letters, vol.84,
pp.3201, 2000.
[38] Y. Hayashi, and J. Matsukubo, “Improvement of the robustness on ge-
ographical networks by adding shortcuts,” Physica A, vol.380, pp.552-
562, 2007.
[39] K.-I. Goh, B. Kahng, and D. Kim, “Universal Behavior of Load
Distribution in Scale-Free Networks,” Physical Review Letters, vol.87,
no.27, pp.278701, 2001.
[40] P. Holme, B.J. Kim, C.N. Yoon, and K. Han, “Attack vulnerability of
complex networks,” Physical Review E, vol.65, pp.056109, 2002.
[41] M.E.J. Newman, “Assortative Mixing in Networks,” Physical Review
Letters, vol.89, no.20, pp.208701, 2003.
[42] R. Pastor-Satorras, and A. Vespignani, Evolution and Structure of the
Internet -A Statistical Physics Approach-, Cambridge University Press,
2004.
[43] R. Xulvi-Brunet, and I.M. Sokolov, “Growing networks under geograph-
ical constraints,” Physical Review E, vol.75, pp.46117, 2007.
[44] L.C. Freeman, “A set of measures of centrality based on betweenness,”
Sociometry, vol.40, pp.35-41, 1977.
[45] Y. Hayashi, “Rethinking of Communication Requests, Routing, and
Navigation Hierarchy on Complex Networks -for a Biologically Inspired
Efficient Search on a Geographical Space-,” In Networks -Emerging
Topics in Computer Science, Chapter 4, pp.67-88, ISBN 978-1-922227-
02-7, A. Rezazadeh, L. Momeni, and I. Bilogrevic (Eds), iConcept
Press, 2012.
[46] S. Dolev, Y. Elovicl, and R. Puzis, “Routing Betweenness Centrality,”
Journal of the ACM, vol.57, no.4, pp.25:1-27, 2010.
[47] H. Shah, “Routing Enhancement Specific to Mobile Environment Using
DTN,” International Journal of Computer Theory and Engineering,
vol.3, no.4, pp.537-542, 2011.
[48] R.J., D’Souza and J. Jose, “Routing Approaches in Delay Tolerant
Networks: A Survey,” International Journal of Computer Applications,
vol.1, no.17, pp.8-14, 2010.
[49] M. Barbeau, and E. Kranakis, Principles of ad hoc networking, Jon
Wiely & Sons, 2007.
